China’s ‘model’ Southeast Asia ties reveal the limits of one-sided relations

Beijing’s definition of ‘model’ ties looks non-controversial at first, but closer inspection reveals a certain type of behaviour being prescribed
Despite the rhetoric, China behaves like any other big power and its own interests are always paramount – just look at the South China Sea

Lye Liang Fook

Published: 8:30am, 30 Apr 2023

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China has described the ties it has with several Southeast Asian nations as “model” relationships.

It has called its twin industrial-estate collaboration with Malaysia an “innovative model of economic cooperation”; hailed its Singapore ties as “forward-looking, strategic and exemplary” and a benchmark for other countries in the region; and sees its friendship with Cambodia as a “model for international relations”.

The appeal of such “model” relationships seems to have grown amid rising US-China tensions and growing wariness of China in the region.

According to Beijing’s rhetoric, countries in a “model” relationship should treat each other with respect and equality regardless of their size, wealth or strength; respect each other’s interests and not engage in activities that undermine these interests; focus more on strengthening cooperation and less on divisive issues; and pursue an independent foreign policy and refrain from taking sides.

Chinese President Xi Jinping shakes hands with Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen in February. Beijing sees its friendship with Cambodia as a “model for international relations”. Photo: Xinhua

Generally, China’s definition of a “model” relationship appears non-controversial. On closer scrutiny, however, China is prescribing how other countries ought to conduct their external relations, in ways with which they may not necessarily agree. For example, merely focusing on cooperation between states while ignoring their differences does not make for sustainable relationships.

A more realistic approach is to cooperate while simultaneously taking steps to address differences, with a view towards managing and ultimately resolving them. For example, a key reason the Philippines has become warier of China is Beijing’s failure to deliver on the promises it made on infrastructure development under Rodrigo Duterte’s administration and its aggressive behaviour towards Philippine vessels in the South China Sea.

Despite its rhetoric that all states are equal, China behaves like any other big power, either resorting to coercion or interpreting international laws and norms in ways that suit its interests. Beijing accords different degrees of importance to individual countries in Southeast Asia. The most important is the “ironclad friendship” it has with Cambodia, a status equivalent to the similarly ironclad ties Beijing says it has with Pakistan.

Beijing’s call for its partners to respect each other’s interests belies the fact that to China, its own interests are paramount. An obvious example is its increased presence and harassment of other claimant countries’ vessels or nationals within its “nine-dash line” claim in the South China Sea.

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Indonesia has had run-ins with Chinese vessels in waters off the Natuna islands, at the southern extreme of the disputed waterway. Even Singapore, a non-claimant state, has irked Beijing by taking a principled stand on upholding international law in supporting the 2016 arbitral decision that concluded China’s nine-dash claim had no legal basis.

Chinese media platforms derided Singapore for “hugging the thigh of the US” and being more anti-China than the Philippines, which brought the South China Sea case to international arbitration. Beijing completely ignored Singapore’s national interest: that as a small country it relies on the rule of law and freedom of navigation for its very survival.

Beijing’s exhortation to Southeast Asian countries to pursue an independent foreign policy can be seen as a warning not to stand with the United States against China. But there are certain issues on which regional countries would prefer to bring in the US – and other key players – so that they have more room to manoeuvre.

The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework counts seven Asean member states – namely Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam – among the 14 countries that are currently signed up. Clearly, Southeast Asian nations would like their key partners to maintain a stake in the region, as well as them being interested in exploring opportunities under the US-led economic initiative in areas such as the digital economy, supply chains and clean energy.

Southeast Asia, comprising many smaller nations, attaches a premium to the sanctity of a rules-based order and international law

Militarily, regional countries generally welcome the US as a potential counterweight against China’s assertiveness. The Philippines in April named four more military bases that US forces will have access to under their Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement.

Although Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr has attempted to assuage China’s concerns by clarifying that the Philippines would not allow its bases to be used for offensive action, he reportedly alluded to Beijing by saying that “if no one were to attack us, they need not worry because we will not fight them”.

Relations between China and Southeast Asia are complex and constantly evolving. The Philippines has shifted from being friendly under Duterte to a more guarded relationship with China under his successor. Even within Cambodia, perceptions of China are subject to change.

The ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute’s State of Southeast Asia 2023 survey indicates that Cambodia’s confidence in China maintaining a rules-based order and upholding international law has plummeted to just 2.2 per cent from 65.4 per cent the year before – the biggest drop among Southeast Asia nations. The survey attributed this dip to China’s “no-limits” partnership with Russia and Beijing’s failure to condemn Moscow after it invaded Ukraine.

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Southeast Asia, comprising many smaller nations, attaches a premium to the sanctity of a rules-based order and international law. In general, these countries do not wish to take sides with any major power but would like to be friends to all.

To shape an order that more nations find amenable, big powers like China may wish to better understand the perspectives of small countries and to be seen to do so. Model bilateral relationships may be possible and could even be more lasting, if they include elements acceptable to both parties rather than to China alone.

Lye Liang Fook, a former Senior Fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, is an independent observer of regional developments. This article was first published by ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute as a Fulcrum commentary.